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Governance versus Government: Drug Consumption Rooms in Australia and the UK
Aim: to evaluate, through a case study, the extent to which elements of governance and 
elements of government are influential in determining the implementation or non-
implementation of a drugs intervention.
Methods: comparative analysis of the case of a drug consumption room in the UK (England)
and Australia (New South Wales), including 16 semi-structured interviews with key 
stakeholders and analysis of relevant documents according to characteristic features of 
governance and government (power decentralisation, power centralisation, independent self-
organising policy networks, use of evidence, top-down steering/directing, legislation).
Results: Characteristic features of both governance and government are found in the data.
Elements of governance are more prominent in New South Wales, Australia than in England,
UK, where government prevails. Government is seen as the most important actor at play in 
the making, or absence, of drug consumption rooms.
Conclusions: Both governance and government are useful frameworks in conceptualising the 
policy process. The governance narrative risks overlooking the importance of traditional 
government structures. In the case of drug consumption rooms in the UK and Australia, a 
focus on government is shown to have been crucial in determining whether the intervention 
was implemented.
Keywords: governance, government, drug consumption rooms, pluralism, asymmetry
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Governance as a concept has gained momentum in academia and beyond. It is no longer old 
government, but new governance. Before the establishment of political institutions at the 
supra-state and international level, and the increased specialisation and stakes of both private 
and third sector, there was less need to theorise the interactions between these different 
levels, and different types, of actors. However, one should not confound governance as a 
guiding analytical framework with a belief that hierarchies and traditional forms of 
government have disappeared (Marsh et al, 2003; Peters, 1997; Marinetto, 2003). In other 
words, we should be wary of embracing a pluralist epistemology before we have the 
empirical evidence to support it, particularly when addressing issues in drug policy, which 
has been characterised as controversial, heavily politicised and ‘wicked’ (Monaghan, 2010; 
Acevedo and Common, 2006; Weber and Khademian, 2008). 
I argue that in order to put forward a more nuanced analysis of the policy process, we should 
abandon false dichotomies and make use of both ‘governance’ and ‘government’. I illustrate 
this through a comparative case study, on the establishment of the Medically Supervised 
Injecting Centre in Sydney and its lacking UK counterpart. In the UK, this policy intervention 
has been mooted at different points in time, but never piloted. This particular intervention has 
been previously discussed in the literature, with some having concentrated on supporting the 
intervention based on positive harm reduction outcomes (Dolan et al, 2000; Kimber et al, 
2005; Maher, 2007; Lloyd and Hunt, 2007; Lloyd and Godfrey, 2010). Others have looked 
specifically at the development of the intervention in Sydney from a policy perspective, 
focusing on the role of civil disobedience (Wodak et al, 2003), police corruption (Fitzgerald, 
2013) and personal experience in the development and running of the facility (van Beek, 
2004). 
This paper builds on this literature, as well as interview data, to establish which factors were 
prominent in the making, or absence, of the intervention. By systematically relating these 
factors to central features of governance and government, the paper also presents significant
theoretical implications. I will demonstrate that although elements of governance were 
significant in the making of this policy debate and intervention, it was traditional government 
structures which determined its continued presence, or absence. 
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Governance and Government
The term governance is well-established, being used in a variety of contexts to refer to ‘the 
exercise of authority within a given sphere’ (Hewitt de Alcantara, 1998). More recently, it 
has come to be associated with the rise of new public management, the prevalence of self-
organising policy networks, the hollowing out of the state and governing at arm’s length
(Rhodes, 1996). On the other hand, government as a conceptual framework is seen as limited 
because it does not recognise the multiplicity of actors outside it who play an important role 
in the policy process; accordingly, government is seen as an ensemble of formal institutions
(Stoker, 1998). It is hierarchical, characterised by dependent networks, a strong state, top-
down steering and directing and centralism (Marsh et al, 2003; Peters, 1997).
Yet the meaning and significance of the term ‘governance’, and the conceptual framework it 
advances, remains ambiguous. As Colebatch (2002, p. 3) noted, ‘the term has been used in 
widely different senses by different writers, and there is little agreement on the terms of the 
debate’. Rhodes (1996) popularised governance as a theoretical narrative; the phrase he 
coined, ‘governing without government’, suggests that government no longer matters. 
Rhodes’ analysis is not devoid of subtleties; however, some careful reading would suggest he 
reaches some overzealous conclusions. As highlighted by Kjær (2011), and admitted by 
Rhodes himself, the latter’s language presents some exaggerations, with statements like 
‘central government is no longer supreme. The political system is increasingly differentiated. 
We live in the ‘centreless society’; in the polycentric state characterised by multiple centres’ 
(Rhodes, 1996, p.657). Rhodes’ ideas have initiated a debate: some have embraced the 
governance narrative (see Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004; Salamon, 2002, Kooiman, 1993),
whereas others have theoretically and empirically challenged Rhodes’ ideas (see Johansson 
and Borell, 1999; Bache, 2003; Marinetto, 2003: Kjaer, 2011, Marsh et al, 2003, Jordan et al, 
2005; Holliday, 2000, Taylor, 1997, Peters, 1997). 
Undoubtedly, governance is useful in understanding shifts in the manner of governing, and in
moving past some of the political and theoretical orthodoxies which characterised most of the 
twentieth century (Colebatch; 2009, Marinetto, 2003). However, in failing to critically reflect 
on how we understand and use governance as a framework, we run the risk of creating new 
political and theoretical orthodoxies, underpinned by a narrowly pluralist vision of power 
(Marsh et al, 2003, Marinetto, 2003). This comes from potentially overlooking the 
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significance of traditional government structures in shaping policy outcomes (Peters, 1997). 
As Colebatch noted, ‘the key elements of the governance narrative […] had already been 
recognised by political scientists before governance was coined as an analytical construct’ 
(2009, p. 8). By uncritically applying the governance narrative, we may risk losing sight of 
the analysis, thus overstating the presence of certain aspects of governance. An alternative is 
arguing for the use of both government and governance as frameworks which are in healthy 
tension with one another. 
To develop this argument this paper needs to establish what the characterising elements of 
government and governance are, before questioning which elements determine the presence
and success of a particular drug policy intervention in the UK and Australian context. 
Decentralisation of power, independent self-organising networks and use of evidence are seen 
as key features of governance. Power centralisation, top-down steering and directing and the 
passing of legislation are seen as key features of government. Note these features are by no 
means exhaustive; rather, they are seen as representative and as such their presence and 
extent in the data should be evaluated. These categories were identified through the aid of 
Marsh’s (2003; 2011) discussion of Rhodes’ Differentiated Polity Model and the alternative
Asymmetric Power Model (2003), to which I now turn.
Pluralism versus Asymmetry
The Differentiated Polity Model, or Narrative (Bevir and Rhodes, 2008), has defining
features which are associated more closely with Governance. In this model, power is 
decentralised and more openly contested, structures are more horizontal and networks from 
outside government have access to both power and resources to organise and participate in 
decision-making. Conversely, an Asymmetric Power Model can be closely associated with 
more traditional forms of Government: the character of decision-making is seen as 
hierarchical, mostly limited to actors inside government; power and resources are unequally 
distributed in a top-down manner (centralism), and access is constrained.
Rhodes’ Differentiated Polity Model was criticised by Marsh et al because it ‘overstresses the 
pluralistic nature of the political system’ (2003, p. 307). In response to Marsh, Bevir and 
Rhodes state that ‘a decentred approach does not seek a general model of power [but] it offers 
narratives of the contingent relationships in the core executive’ (2008; p. 733). Even if the 
Differentiated Polity Model is not concerned with power structures but contingent relations, 
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to what degree can questions of power distribution be ignored and what consequences might 
this have? Bevir and Rhodes accuse Marsh of mistaking ‘oligopoly’ for ‘pluralism’, yet they 
refuse to directly engage with issues of power distribution (2008; p. 729). Marsh et al do the 
opposite by stating that ‘the key actors in policy making in Britain are still within, rather than 
outside, the core executive. The exchange relationships involved are asymmetric with most 
power still resting with central government’ (2003, p. 315). Marsh et al claim that any power 
shift from central to local government is managerial, rather than political (2003, p. 316). 
When comparing UK to other European countries, Klijn substantiates this by noting ‘the 
relative weakness of local governments’ (2008, p. 515). This contention will be further 
explored in the discussion below.
Description of the Case Study
The UK and Australia witnessed a growth of injecting heroin use in the 1980s and 1990s. By 
the late 1990s, the problem of street-based injectors had been identified in both countries, 
with associated public health and public nuisance consequences. Drug consumption rooms as 
a harm reduction strategy were being discussed since the mid-1990s in Kings Cross, Sydney, 
and the trial of a safe injecting centre was recommended by the Royal Commission into the 
New South Wales Police Service in 1997 (Woods Royal Commission, p. 13-4). During the 
New South Wales Drug Summit of 1999, this recommendation was reiterated and put to 
parliament for discussion (Swain, 1999). The New South Wales parliament passed legislation 
to allow a trial of a Medically Supervised Injecting Centre which opened in 2001 (van Beek, 
2004). The UK’s problem was not as geographically concentrated as in New South Wales, 
and did not involve significant police corruption as was the case in Sydney. However, a 
similar recommendation to pilot a safe injecting site came from the Home Affairs Select 
Committee report in 2002 (15, para 186). The Home Office responded negatively to this 
recommendation on the basis of lack of evidence (Hunt and Lloyd, 2008). This prompted an 
independent working group, supported by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, to look at the 
issue in some detail to produce a review in 2006, making the case for the piloting of safe 
injecting sites in the UK (Independent Working Group, 2006). This was followed by another 
negative response by the Home Office. A pilot was never implemented, and the issue recently 
resurfaced in Brighton, where the intervention is currently being considered (Wise, 2013). 
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Methods
The case study of drug consumption rooms was selected according to a number of criteria, 
with contrast and similarity as the principal criteria. Contrast and similarity also inform the 
selection of countries, Australia and the UK, as units of analysis.  In particular, the contrast 
between success and failure, understood as the implementation or non-implementation of the 
intervention, offers significant potential for generating more powerful explanations (Varese,
2011). A multi-level embedded design takes into consideration characteristics of the larger 
units of analysis, Australia and the UK, allowing a focus on smaller units, England and New 
South Wales, and a particular case (drug consumption rooms) nested within them (Yin, 
2003). Comparison across states in Australia and across regions in the UK was not pursued; 
only New South Wales and England are being considered. However, the multi-level design’s 
characteristic of embeddedness allows some of the limitations imposed by the specificity of 
individual cases to be overcome; smaller units of analysis are nested in larger units, and are
observed relationally (Yin, 2003).
Data was garnered from 16 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders as well as relevant 
documents including reviews (Independent Working Group; 2006) government reports
(HASC: 2002; Wood: 1997; Independent Drugs Commission: 2013; Swain: 1999) and 
evaluations (MSIC evaluation committee: 2003).  The interviews’ broader focus was the use 
of evidence in policy. As such, an explicit selection criterion was participants’ involvement in 
policy-relevant or policy-related research and drug consumption rooms in particular.
However, discussions broadened to other issues in drug policy, including decriminalisation
and harm reduction interventions. Participants were selected according to their direct 
involvement in advocating, researching, debating, evaluating and implementing the 
intervention. Following the logic of purposive sampling, I identified - through the use of 
relevant documents, including academic publications and grey literature - a number of 
relevant stakeholders who played a significant role in the drug consumption rooms’ debate 
and - through snowballing - gained access to other relevant stakeholders. Notably, the same 
names were oftentimes mentioned by participants, which indicates that a number of
representative stakeholders have been included in the sample and that good penetration of the 
policy network was achieved.
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Participants belonged to several professional categories which can be grouped into three 
overarching classifications: researchers (including clinicians), politicians (including political 
advisors and bureaucrats) and advocates. However, these categories often intertwine, with 
some participants belonging to two or more categories. Interview transcripts were treated as 
narratives. The analysis was conducted in an iterative manner. Quotes were extracted 
according to themes that emerged in both countries and were pertinent with, but not exclusive 
to, model characteristics of government and governance. Then, quotes were further selected 
according to the specific features of governance and government highlighted in the previous 
section. These accounts, if partial, represent the thoughts and lived experience of stakeholders 
in relation to the intervention. By selecting pieces of participants’ narrated perspectives on 
their involvement and thoughts around the intervention, the analysis below highlights which 
elements of governance and which elements of government contributed to implementation, or 
lack thereof. 
Quotes have been assigned using the following codes: A=Australia, U=UK, R=Researcher, 
P=Politician, AD=Advocate. These will be used in relevant combinations followed by 
numerical identifiers when necessary. The identifying letters have been assigned in order of 
importance, based on a judgement of the degree to which participants belonged to the 
different professional categories. The following sections are divided according to 
characteristics of governance and government identified in the previous section.
Decentralisation of power
In England, attention has been dedicated to the impact of new localism legislation on the 
ability for local authorities to make independent political decisions. However promising 
localism may look in terms of the potential it provides for power decentralisation, most 
considerations up to this point have been speculative, with much scepticism characterising 
the debate. This was recognised by participants in relation to the possibility that Brighton 
might opt for piloting a drug consumption room:
Everybody in government […] is saying localism, localism, budgets 
down, we won’t tell you how to spend them, you make your own 
judgement (UADP).
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One could argue that recent shifts implemented through the localism agenda have increased 
the political power of local authorities. In Marsh et al (2003), local authorities were seen as 
managerially independent from - yet politically dependent on - central government.  One 
example of a persistent policy community identified by Marsh et al was ‘that between the 
Home Office and the Association of Chief Police Officers’ (2003, p. 318). The introduction 
of Policing and Crime Commissioners (PCC) may signal a shift of political power away from 
the Home Office and the Association of Chief Police Officers. However, this might depend 
on the PCC’s own political agenda:
One PCC would never allow any difference between them and a 
Conservative Home Secretary, because they probably want the job at 
some point in the future. Whereas you’ve got a few PCCs […] who 
would love to poke the Home Secretary in the eyes (UADP).
Power Centralisation/Centralism 
While there is indication of power centralisation in New South Wales, centralism, defined as 
the political dependence of local authorities on central government, appears to dominate UK 
accounts (Davies, 2000). This is because in New South Wales, the type of power 
centralisation encountered is more managerial in character. After the New South Wales Drug 
Summit, an Office of Drug Policy was created and managed through the Cabinet Office and 
ministerial staff to coordinate reforms that followed the recommendations put forward at the 
Summit, including the establishment of the Medically Supervised Injecting Centre. This was 
seen as essential, because one of the issues identified at the Summit was the lack of central 
direction in drug policy, which thus far had been compartmentalised; whereas the extent of 
power decentralisation in New South Wales drug policy had been greater, this changed after 
the 1999 Drug Summit:
In many respects we were taking power away from most [departments] and 
centralising it with one small team of bureaucrats […] this little office had 
to slap all these different agencies into submission (AP1)
England presents a political kind of centralism, whereby local authorities are subjected to 
political pressure from central government. In the case of the drug consumption rooms’ 
debate: 
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Local areas have thought: ‘yes! This is what we want! […]the will is there, 
and then the police chief says 'no bloody way!' […]and the problem has 
been the Home Office who […] have contacted local police chiefs and put 
pressure on them (URAD1)
This is a clear instance of the asymmetric power relation between central and local 
authorities, as identified by Marsh et al (2003). A similar episode occurred in Sydney. After 
the 1997 Woods Royal Commission into police corruption, a Joint Select Committee into 
Safe Injecting Rooms was called. One participant suggested that members of the Committee 
were pressured to vote against the piloting of a facility despite the Woods Report’s 
favourable recommendations:
There was a 6-4 vote against the recommendation to establish the 
Medically Supervised Injecting Centre, basically because the political 
parties […] told the members of the committee how they were to vote 
(AADR)
Independent self-organising networks and partnerships
Peters and Pierre claim that ‘the dominant feature of the governance model is the argument 
that networks have come to dominate public policy’ and ‘if governments attempt to impose 
control over policy, these networks have sufficient resiliency and capacity for self-
organisation’ (1998, p. 225). In Sydney, some participants argued that an act of civil 
disobedience - which saw a network establish a tolerance room for injecting in Wayside 
Chapel, Kings Cross, weeks before the Drug Summit - was the catalyst for including the issue 
on the Summit’s agenda (Wodak et al, 2003):
It started off at Wayside Chapel and eventually got government support 
[…] sometimes an act of civil disobedience forces the hand of 
government (AADP)
This could be seen as an instance of both strong independent networks and power 
decentralisation. Here, an independent network pulled together its power and resources to 
provoke a response, 
We had to […] set up this illegal Medically Supervised Injecting Centre
to make sure that that got on the agenda […] the government negotiated 
discreetly with some of us and said, if you close down the illegal 
Medically Supervised Injecting Centre, we will put that back on the 
agenda (AADR).
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This statement implies that the group had significant leverage; it was not the network that had 
to bend to the will of government, it was the government that had to accommodate the 
demands of the network. In this instance, it appears that the dominant feature of the 
governance model, the strength of independent networks, can be validated. 
To facilitate the establishment of the facility, participants recognised the importance of 
community support, working intersectorally across agencies and in partnership, nurturing 
support across the board at the local level, with direction by a local leader and coordinator. 
You need somebody who is a kind of champion […] working […]
intersectorally […] with the police […] with the ambulance […] with the 
local council to establish some degree of support for that facility (AR).
The importance of partnerships was stressed not only locally but also in relation to the pursuit 
of active collaboration across agencies and departments. Health and law enforcement are 
often seen as in opposition to one another. However, in the case of this intervention in Kings 
Cross:
Law enforcement and health were pretty much working in partnership 
[…] the big battles between health and law enforcement have pretty 
much disappeared (ARP)
There is an established political consensus around the benefits of multi-agency partnerships,
which is seen as part and parcel of implementing good governance structures. However, there 
is indication that partnerships, particularly those between government departments and non-
governmental organisations, are asymmetrical. Fitzgerald notes how ‘partnerships’, often 
recognised as one of the cornerstones of governance, do ‘not fully account for the often 
inequitable power relations between government and other stakeholders’; this is because ‘the 
language of partnerships implies a level playing field, whereas the reality of purchaser-
provider funding frameworks often work differently’ (2005, p. 283). As such, there is a 
difference between a symmetrical partnership between two government departments
(governance), as was the case for health and law enforcement in relation to the Medically 
Supervised Injecting Centre, and an asymmetrical one between governmental and non-
governmental organisations. The role of strong independent networks and symmetrical 
partnerships was crucial in the Sydney case. However, England was lacking a strong 
independent network, whereas partnerships, such as that between the Home Office and the 
police, have tended to be more asymmetrical.
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Role of evidence/experts: Governance, Government or both?
Evidence has a crucial role in shaping policy debates and informing policy practice. The 
number of agencies external to government that act as advisory bodies has increased, and 
government structures and mechanisms are set up to encourage expert participation 
(MacGregor, 2012). Participants have stressed the role of independent experts and evidence
as prevalent in decision-making around this intervention. In the UK context, the gathering of 
evidence was seen as being able to move the debate on drug consumption rooms beyond the 
realm of politics:
[It] was very much a sort of evidence informed working group rather than 
something more political. […] we had three professors on it […] evidence was 
always gonna be important […] I put together a group of highly respectable 
people, I thought it might have some weight; it'd make it harder for them to 
dismiss it than a bunch of radicals (URAD1).
It appears as though researchers and advocates hoped that presenting compelling evidence 
would be sufficient to shift the debate away from the politics. This implies the assumption
that evidence is neutral:
The important thing for me is the need for […] the evidence, and the judgement 
on whether it is a useful service to provide, should be a local discussion, not a 
political discussion. (URAD2)
However, not all participants found the evidence convincing, demonstrating that evidence is 
contested and as such is not a neutral instrument:
I don’t see how [the evidence] stacks up, no one has ever been prepared to spend 
money on it (URP)
In New South Wales, evidence was used strategically by policy-makers to neutralise an 
otherwise heavily politicised debate. The deployment of experts and evidence during the 
Drug Summit was seen as paramount to shift ideas away from entrenched positions:
The thing about the summit […] was that the politicians were trapped in that 
room and they had to listen to experts […] it was the evidence that came through 
(AP1)
However, it should be noted that the role of evidence in this setting is not necessarily the 
norm. The New South Wales Drug Summit of 1999 is a particular instance of open decision-
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making, which is considered a rare occurrence. While in this instance the debate was open 
and participatory, which would suggest that governance was prevalent, this was not the case 
for other instances where evidence played a major role. 
The first evaluation of the Medically Supervised Injecting Centre was seen as a way to shelter 
the intervention from criticism:
It was independent, there were professors involved […] even some of the worse 
shock jocks […] found it hard to argue against someone that’s from a University, 
a reputable, credible Professor (AP1)
However, the evaluation process was seen by participants as a very political affair, with much 
interference from government:
It was a highly political program where there was constant struggle, with the
policy-makers or the bureaucrats looking over our shoulder […] it was way too 
political (ARP)
Whilst most understood the importance of the first evaluation, the motive of the subsequent 
evaluations was identified as chiefly political:
This centre had already been rigorously evaluated for the first time […] yet they 
were spending a lot of time and resources in a second phase evaluation (AR)
It was suggested that the facility was perhaps disproportionately subjected to external 
evaluation, which is not common practice in health, for political reasons.
I think all services should be subject to that kind of assessment, I just don’t 
understand the obsession with that centre keep getting assessed and no others do.
(AADR)
It appears that evidence can be used as a tool of governance, as in the case of the Drug 
Summit, but also as a tool of government. Resources and networks can be steered and 
directed by government to produce the kind of evidence that suits its political needs. Stevens 
(2007) termed this process the ‘farming’ and ‘trawling’ of evidence by policy-makers; in the
case of the Medically Supervised Injecting Centre, policy-makers used the evaluations they 
commissioned (farming) to demonstrate local community support and to respond to media 
attacks (trawling). However, it was not simply about government protecting itself, but also 
about government protecting the facility from criticism. 
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Top-down steering/directing
The New South Wales government apparently saw itself as a political shepherd, strategically 
managing the setting up of the facility as a trial, the evaluations, and media communication:
The centre wasn’t the way some people would have liked it but it’s still 
there today because of the way it was set up and all the restrictions [that] 
protected it […]it was shepherded through so carefully! (AP1).
Participants agreed that had the premier not supported the first trial, there probably would 
never have been one:
The Premier […] who had lost a brother to drug overdose, was quite 
ambivalent. […] If he had said no, that was it. Game over, right from the 
start. (AP1)
The facility had dual licensees, NSW Police and Health, but was effectively run by an NGO, 
UnitingCare. The reason for this was again put down to the government’s strategic thinking, 
which presents both elements of governance (regulation at arms’ length) and government 
(central steering and directing through government’s own departments and funding). It is, in 
Taylor’s words, ‘arm’s-length but hands-on’ (1997, p. 441). 
I guess they wanted to arm’s-length themselves, if it fell over, but at the 
same time they wanted a huge amount of control, which normally in a 
non-government organisation you wouldn’t have. But, I guess because 
money was coming from them… (AADR)
For central government, resources allocation is a key steering and directing mechanism. 
Participants indicated that the continued trial status, much like the evaluations, was a political 
strategy. Whilst politicians saw it as necessary, others did not:
It became apparent that the trial status itself was […] an ongoing strategy 
and there was no real endpoint […] and that was mostly politically 
driven (AADR)
In the UK, at the time when discussions had reached a peak of interest, the New Labour 
government was unpopular, whilst the Home Office was hit by an internal scandal (Hunt and 
Lloyd, 2008):
Labour did disastrously in local elections, […]we felt we were nearly 
[…]getting a pilot, but because of all this stuff there was just a knee-jerk 
response […] a fascinating example of how […]politics can override 
absolutely everything (URAD1).
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Considerations seem to converge around what could be politically feasible and what would 
be electorally damaging:
Anything that seemed to involve enabling drug use and that looked 
liberal or progressive or soft on drugs […] was politically threatening 
because it would be seized on by the opposition to say that Labour [was]
soft on drugs, and that would be electorally damaging (URAD2).
This type of intervention did not fit with the dominant drug policy narrative, and therefore 
could not be considered because it would symbolise a discursive shift which the government 
could not afford, particularly at a time when the New Labour party was unpopular and 
considering they had used the ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ rhetoric as a 
platform.
Legislation
In the UK, passing legislation to implement this type of intervention is not essential 
(Independent Working Group, 2006):
You don’t have to ask any high-powered permission of parliament to do it, 
the whole issue is around, is anybody wanting to take the criticism? And that 
does affect local politicians […] police chiefs, directors of public health, are 
very conscious of that (UADP)
As such, the problem is not around the law as much as it is around whether local authorities 
are willing to take risks and be the subject of criticism. In New South Wales, participants 
recognised that passing special legislation to enable the intervention was necessary. In the 
first instance:
It was just a couple of votes in the upper house that came down to getting 
it through or not, because it had to be legislated (AP1).
More recently, new legislation ended the trial status,
because we, the Labor government […] recognised that if we did not 
make it permanent before we were thrown out […] our opponents 
[would] certainly close the medically supervised injection room (AP2).
Political actors used legislation as a way to protect the facility. However, legislation has a 
strategic purpose. Participants have referred to legislation as a way for government to protect 
itself, as the change in legislation is not substantial, only allowing self-administration within 
the confines of the centre:
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We have just got one Act of parliament that allows one injecting centre 
to operate under very specific requirements, […] if you could repeal self-
administration […][we] could indeed accommodate injecting without 
risking being charged with aiding and abetting a crime, which is the legal 
barrier that exists (AADR)
There was no support for this intervention by the Liberal party, either at Federal or at state 
level. Therefore, had the Liberals been in power, or had the Federal government been able to 
out rule the state’s decision, the intervention is not likely to have come to pass:
That shows the strength of a state system. […] the injecting centre would 
never have happened if it was under federal jurisdiction because you never 
would have got the consensus (AADR).
Discussion: Governance with Government
The Sydney Medically Supervised Injecting Centre came into being in the context of a
burgeoning heroin epidemic which disproportionately affected the population around Kings 
Cross (van Beek, 2004). The factors which prompted the trial of the Medically Supervised 
Injecting Centre were manifold: cheap heroin, together with the characteristics of Kings 
Cross itself as hosting a transient, bohemian community, the already existing illegal shooting 
galleries facilitated by police corruption, the rising number of overdose deaths, public 
injecting and drug litter, moral panics and regular media reporting of these issues (Fitzgerald, 
2013). The act of civil disobedience that established a tolerance room for injecting, along 
with the presence of advocates and political support from across the board, championed by 
the experienced long-term director of the low-threshold primary care service in the area, were 
all important factors (Wodak et al, 2003). These, together, made a strong case for the issue to 
be discussed at the New South Wales Drug Summit of 1999. All the characteristics of 
governance were present and significant (policy networks, open decision-making, 
involvement of experts and actors outside government, production, consideration and 
discussion of evidence, regulation at arms’ length, multi-agency involvement and 
partnership). However, the power to make or break the intervention resided with the state, its 
legislative authority, the support of the premier, the minister in charge, the parliamentary 
majority, and the strategic management of evidence, resources and communication. In the 
UK, the issue of drug consumption rooms has gained momentum at several junctures. The 
Home Affairs Select Committee Report in 2002, the Independent Working Group in 2006, 
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and the recent discussions in Brighton in 2013 are all instances of this. However, so far the 
issue has never made it past the favourable recommendations. The intervention often 
triggered interest and received support at the local level, but it was never endorsed by central 
government. 
‘With the shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’, parliamentary processes are 
now expected to link decision-makers to wider networks in a pluralistic and 
diverse civic society. In the drugs field, policy networks have expanded, 
presenting challenges for accountability mechanisms’ (McGregor: 2012, p. 27). 
This statement appears to imply an acceptance that governance translates into some form of 
pluralism, and highlights the problematic aspect of accountability, bypassing the problem of 
asymmetries and the vertical nature of decision-making that still characterises much policy-
making. As Taylor reminds us, ‘government is not just another organisation’ (1997, p. 441). 
There needs to be ‘a commitment to governance with government’, because government has 
‘a responsibility to the public that other nongovernment l actors do not have’ (Weber and 
Khademian, 2008, p. 341).
Although elements of governance influence the presence of an issue on the political agenda, 
it is government that critically turns the issue into substance. It seems clear that actors inside 
government had a primary role in determining the presence, or absence, of this policy 
intervention. In the case of Sydney, key state government actors endorsed the intervention. 
Their steering and directing was strategic and astute; they set out to protect the facility 
through careful political, rhetorical and managerial tactics, ultimately ensuring its long term 
survival and current standing. In this case, government steering and directing and legislative
powers were used to introduce a controversial intervention which achieved significant public 
health benefits (MSIC evaluation committee, 2003). Conversely, and despite the presence of 
advocates, the willingness of local authorities, and supporting evidence, central government 
actors in the UK obstructed the opportunity for local governments to opt for such an 
intervention by exerting pressure over key agencies such as the police. As expected in Marsh 
et al’s Asymmetric Power Model, this case shows both the relative weakness of local 
governments, and the strong, albeit asymmetric partnership between the Home Office and the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (2003). Here, government significantly contributed to
the lack of implementation of this particular intervention.
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These cases have been useful to point out that pursuing governance without government 
might lead us to a skewed picture. Government appears to retain its role as the central actor, 
and the presence and resistance of networks, albeit significant, does not necessarily diminish 
its power. Fitzgerald’s work (2005) on the Australian National Council on Drugs seems to 
suggest that power structures remain mostly asymmetrical at the federal level in Australia. 
This is corroborated by the dominance of the ‘tough on drugs’ rhetoric and the lack of prime 
ministerial support for safe injecting sites. However, state level polities nested in federal
governmental structures may present a different picture. In New South Wales, it would 
appear that the state’s ability to legislate was crucial to the implementation of an intervention 
which was contrary to the wishes of federal government. I argue that a state’s legislative 
powers can act as a shield against domestic, federal and international pressures. However, as 
Walti and Kubler pointed out in the Swiss case (2003), this does not necessarily translate into 
a pluralistic power model, as state authorities retain the power to exclude certain actors and 
voices by strategically directing resources. The continued trial status, the ‘farming’ and 
‘trawling’ of evaluations and the refusal to repeal self-administration as a criminal offence 
beyond the walls of the Medically Supervised Injecting Centre are all instances of this. 
Although an Asymmetric Power Model is not necessarily representative of the New South
Wales case, the extent to which a Differentiated Polity Model is more apt should be the 
subject of further academic scrutiny. 
Would legislative political authority at the local level in England have made a difference at 
nodal points during the drug consumption rooms’ debate? The question remains. Will 
Brighton go ahead with its plan to pilot a safe injecting site? The local MP openly supports it, 
and she is not a member of either of the two major political parties, as was the case for Clover 
Moore in Kings Cross, Sydney. This MP, Caroline Lucas, has been a vocal supporter of drug 
law reform, and the Independent Drugs Commission for Brighton and Hove was established
following her proposal (Independent Drugs Commission, 2013). It will be interesting to 
observe whether the increasingly devolved power structure in the UK, as well as the reforms 
that followed the introduction of localism in England, might change the distribution of power 
in the asymmetric British polity.
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